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Abstract
An increasing reliance on solar and wind power has raised concern about system abil-
ity to consistently satisfy electricity demand. This paper examines countries unilateral
incentives to achieve supply security through capacity reserves and market integration in a
multinational electricity market. Capacity reserves protect consumers against blackouts and
extreme prices, but distort consumption and investment. Market integration alleviates sup-
ply constraints, but requires costly network reinforcement. Capacity reserves can be up- or
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1 Introduction
Support schemes to increase the production of energy from renewable sources now are common
in many parts of the world as part of a policy to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and the
dependence on energy imports.1 The subsidization of renewable electricity often has sparked
investments predominantly in solar and wind power.2 The output uctuations inherent to solar
and wind power have subsequently raised concern about the ability to continuously satisfy
demand in a system that relies on such intermittent electricity production.
In circumstances of a substantial shortfall of renewable output, the system operator may
be forced to disconnect consumers from the grid in order to maintain system stability. Such
rolling blackouts (curtailment) represent the most dramatic manifestation of supply shortage,
but scarcity a¤ects consumers negatively also in less extreme circumstances. Price insensitive
short-run demand for electricity and capacity constraints in production and transmission imply
that the market-clearing spot price of electricity can be very high in event the system is supply
constrained even if not on the verge of collapse. The tolerance for blackouts and extreme prices
is very limited in advanced economies. A key feature of a viable electricity system based upon
renewable electricity production therefore is to maintain a security of supply, i.e. ensure that
there is adequate generation capacity to satisfy demand at acceptable consumer prices.3
There are two main ways how countries can achieve supply security. The rst is to keep
capacity reserves as backup in event of supply shortages in the spot market. Reserves often are
procured by the use of capacity mechanisms such as auctions for generation capacity. Typical
mechanisms address the problem of blackouts by requiring that available production capacity
has a su¢ cient reserve margin to prevent the loss of load probability from exceeding some target
level.4 They limit consumer price exposure by establishing trigger levels in the spot market
above which capacity reserves are activated; see Neuho¤ et al. (2016) for a characterization of
common mechanisms.5 ;6
1See, for instance, the EU Renewables Directive (2009/28/EC) for a formulation of such objectives.
2Germany is a leading example of a country that has started a transition to an electricity system based
on renewables. Approximately one fourth of the countrys annual electricity production came from renewable
sources in 2014. The corresponding gure was 6% at the turn of the millennium. Two-thirds of this increase can
be attributed to solar and wind power. The data were retrieved from www.iea.org/statistics/ November 4, 2016.
3The Union of the Electricity Industry in Europe (Eurelectric, 2006, p.15) denes security of electricity supply
as the ability of the electrical power system to provide electricity to end-users with a specied level of continuity
and quality in a sustainable manner.This denition appears to encompass curtailment alone, but in the subse-
quent discussion Eurelectric emphasizes that energy prices can also have an inuence on security of supply. For
instance, if electricity prices were to rise enduringly to levels which were not a¤ordable for a substantial portion
of customers (households and industry), there would be an impact on security of supply.Oren (2005) similarly
views capacity reserves as an insurance both against curtailment and high prices.
4The loss of load probability is the likelihood that available production capacity is insu¢ cient to cover demand
within a given period. For instance, ERCOT (Texas) and PJM (North-East USA) apply the same "one day in
ten years" loss of load criterion for reserve margins. France and Great Britain use a very similar criterion.
5Trigger prices often are explicit. For instance, NEM (Eastern and Southern Australia) and PJM dene a
specic price cap in the short-term market for situations of supply scarcity. Columbia and New England instead
use capacity mechanisms based upon the more unusual reliability options. Producers are forced to issue call
options for the contracted capacity reserve at some regulated strike price and to pay consumers the di¤erence
between the spot price and the strike price. By way of this construction, consumers de facto pay the minimum
of the strike price and the spot price for their electricity (Cramton et al., 2013).
6Trigger prices can also be implicit. In Sweden, for instance, the system operator activates the capacity reserve
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The second solution is to increase network capacity and thereby improve the ow of electricity
within the system. Better market integration reduces the likelihood of supply shortage and lowers
market prices by allowing demand and supply uctuations in di¤erent parts of the network to
o¤set one another. Network expansion is regulated and undertaken by the network owner.
In a multinational electricity market, the price e¤ects associated with capacity reserves and
network investment propagate through to surrounding countries. Decisions at the national level
concerning security of supply therefore run the risk of impairing the overall market performance
insofar as local policy makers fail to fully account for the e¤ects of their decisions. The concerns
expressed by the European Commission (2015, p.10) in the recent framework strategy for an
Energy Union about "divergent national market arrangements" and a necessity to ensure that
"capacity mechanisms and support for renewable electricity are fully in line with existing rules
and do not distort the internal energy market" bear testimony to this perception.
Scope The purpose of this paper is to contribute to our understanding of the incentives for
introducing capacity mechanisms in markets with intermittent renewable electricity generation.
It emphasizes the implications of and consequences for market integration by couching the
problem in a multinational electricity market setting. A main objective is to identify and account
for foreign external e¤ects and assess the overall welfare consequences of decentralized policy
making associated with security of supply problems.
Model description I consider a theoretical model of two symmetric and interconnected na-
tional electricity markets.7 Market integration is measured in terms of network reliability. The
market is perfectly integrated and spot prices the same in both countries if the interconnec-
tion is fully operational. The two markets are separate and spot prices are set at the national
level in the alternative scenario when the interconnection is down. Supply shortages sometimes
arise because short-term demand is independent of the spot price of electricity (Joskow and Ti-
role, 2007), renewable production is stochastic, and thermal production capacity is constrained.
There exists no market-clearing price in this case (Cramton and Stoft, 2006). Instead, the price
is set at a price cap. The capacity reserve required to cover supply shortages in the spot market
is larger if the price cap is smaller because then long-term demand for electricity is higher and
spot market-based investment in thermal capacity is smaller.8 This is the well-known missing
money problem in electricity markets; see e.g. Joskow (2007) and Hogan (2013). Conversely, a
larger capacity reserve implies that a smaller price cap is su¢ cient to generate enough market-
whenever demand in the spot market exceeds supply at a price equal to the maximal observed supply bid. The
capacity reserve is supplied to clear the spot market at this price. This means that the spot price of electricity in
Sweden cannot exceed the short-term marginal production cost of the most expensive unit in the market if the
spot market is otherwise competitive.
7This is really a model of market integration between jurisdictions, where each jurisdiction unilaterally decides
the size of its capacity reserve and network investment. In the present context, these jurisdictions are countries,
but one could equally well assume them to be states, such as in the U.S.
8Reliability criteria, such as those mentioned in footnote 4, are strict. Accordingly, rolling blackouts are very
infrequent events in most restructured electricity markets. A sector inquiry in the EU found one single instance of
consumers being disconnected during the last ve years. This happened during a heat wave in Poland in August
2015 (European Commission, 2016). For simplicity, the model assumes a target level of curtailment equal to zero.
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based investment in thermal capacity to cover demand. A larger capacity reserve therefore is
equivalent to a higher security of supply, all else equal.
Findings The socially optimal capacity reserve balances the marginal benet of an increased
security of supply against excessive consumption and insu¢ cient thermal investment resulting
from a downward distortion in the long-run (expected) price of electricity. These e¤ects spill
over to the foreign country in an integrated market, but policy makers that maximize domestic
surplus account for none of them. Still, decentralized policy making does not entail any welfare
loss if market integration is perfect and capacity reserves are e¢ ciently deployed. Symmetry
then implies that decision makers e¤ectively internalize all externalities abroad of changes in the
domestic capacity reserve, and the social optimum can be implemented as a Nash equilibrium.
Equilibrium capacity reserves are distorted in the general case of partial (imperfect) market
integration, but the magnitude and direction of the distortion depends on two opposing e¤ects.
On the one hand, the probability of a supply shortage is relatively small under market inte-
gration because of trade and imperfect correlation of renewable output. This portfolio e¤ect of
market integration calls for smaller capacity reserves in social optimum. On the other hand, an
integrated market allows for a more e¢ cient use of a given capacity reserve. This cost e¢ ciency
of market integration increases the socially optimal capacity reserve. The net foreign externality
is negative (positive) if the portfolio e¤ect dominates cost e¢ ciency, in which case the equilib-
rium capacity reserve is too large (small) in a partially integrated market relative to the social
optimum.
I endogenize market integration by allowing investment in network reliability, either at the
central level to maximize total welfare, or at the national level. An increase in the capacity
reserve decreases (increases) the marginal value of market integration if the foreign externality
is negative (positive) and thereby reduces (increases) network investment. This strategic substi-
tutability (complementarity) between capacity reserves and market integration causes downward
distortions of network reliability because the capacity reserve is too large (small) from a social
point of view under a negative (positive) foreign externality. Hence, investment in network relia-
bility is unambiguously downward distorted. Decentralized network investment exacerbates this
underinvestment problem further insofar as domestic policy makers ignore the positive e¤ects
abroad of improved market integration.
A main motive for capacity reserves is a concern over prices when the spot market is supply
constrained. An obvious solution would seem to be that consumers worried about prices instead
sign nancial contracts to hedge their spot price risk. I show that the socially optimal capacity
reserve is indeed close to zero if consumers can purchase call options in a competitive nancial
market that renders the equilibrium option price equal to the expected option payment. The
market diversies away all risk in this case. But consumers would still prefer the capacity
mechanism because the capacity payments to producers are distributed across all consumers,
even those who do not demand any hedge, whereas the nancial contract is a private cost. A
policy maker who attached more weight to specic consumer interests would have an incentive
to introduce capacity reserves even if ine¢ cient. Furthermore, it is doubtful whether sellers
4
can always diversify away all risk. For instance, they can be liquidity constrained retailers or
producers.9 Capacity reserves arise in equilibrium and can be welfare improving even under
nancial contracting in case buyers and sellers strictly benet from risk reduction.
I nally consider the e¤ect of dening supply shortage at the national level instead of at
the aggregate level, and requiring that capacity reserves be directed towards solving domestic
capacity problems. The resulting dispatch of the capacity reserve then is ine¢ cient, which
makes market-based outcomes comparatively more attractive from an e¢ ciency viewpoint. This
reduces the socially optimal and equilibrium capacity reserve.
Related literature Notwithstanding the policy discussion surrounding electricity markets
with renewable production, this paper is one of only a few to endogenize the security of electricity
supply. An explanation for the lack of research can be that standard economic theory posits that
specic measures are unnecessary to ensure the security of supply. A competitive "energy-only"
market where customers only pay for the amount of energy they consume and generators only
are paid for the amount of energy they produce is su¢ cient. Price hikes in times of scarcity will
create just enough rent to render the socially optimal investments in thermal capacity privately
protable (Hogan, 2005; Oren, 2005 and Joskow, 2007).
The e¢ ciency of an energy-only market arises under ideal market conditions where demand
is price sensitive enough always to deliver some, possibly very high, price that clears the market.
It is arguable whether current electricity markets t this description, not least because many
households are on contracts that do not incite them to respond to short-term price signals.
Cramton and Stoft (2006) and Cramton et al. (2013) argue that appropriately designed capacity
mechanisms are an e¢ cient way of resolving associated supply constraints.
Joskow and Tirole (2007) show in their seminal contribution that price insensitive short-term
demand alone is insu¢ cient to vindicate capacity mechanisms on e¢ ciency grounds. Instead,
capacity obligations have the potential to improve e¢ ciency if curtailment is ine¢ cient or if
price signals are distorted, for example as a result of market power or because of regulatory
intervention. Joskow and Tirole (2007) explore in detail capacity obligations in relation to
imperfect competition. Creti and Fabra (2007) and Schwenen (2014) illustrate in a similar vein
how capacity reserves mitigate strategic withholding of production from the spot market.
There can be reasons for maintaining capacity reserves even in a competitive electricity
market with e¢ cient curtailment. E¢ ciency requires that the price cap is set at the consumer
cost of involuntary rationing, the value of lost load (VOLL), so that consumers on average
are indi¤erent between being rationed or not in scarcity situations (Stoft, 2002). The general
applicability of such a policy can be disputed, not only because VOLL is di¢ cult to estimate
correctly, but also because it may be politically infeasible to permit the electricity price to
9An illustrative example is the California electricity market at the turn of the millennium. The price hedge
consisted of a regulated retail price with retailers carrying the full spot price risk. All three investor-owned
retailers subsequently ran into serious nancial di¢ culties as spot prices soared to record levels in the summer of
2000, and one of them went bankrupt. See Wolak (2003) for diagnosis of the famous California electricity crisis.
Producers carry the spot price risk under the system of reliability options, unless they themselves manage to
hedge this risk. Neuho¤ et al. (2016) discuss the distribution of risks associated with reliability options.
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increase by a factor of 100 or more above its average level to achieve VOLL (Cramton et al., 2013).
Furthermore, investors may question the credibility of VOLL pricing, in which case the desired
investments will not come about (Joskow and Tirole, 2007).Neuho¤ et al. (2016, p.258) argue
that trigger prices must be set su¢ ciently low in capacity mechanisms else they would "clearly
a¤ect the social acceptance of the energy market design."10 The present paper incorporates the
idea of politically acceptable prices by assuming that supply constraints has negative market
external consequences for a subset of consumers. Policy makers account for these consumer
e¤ects in the choice of capacity reserves. The equilibrium capacity reserve (and price cap)
balances the marginal benet of protecting consumers against blackouts and high prices against
the price distortions to long-run demand and thermal investment.11 Placing the problem in a
multinational electricity market setting permits an analysis of the interaction between capacity
reserves and market integration and to shed light on consequences of decentralized policy making.
Meyer and Gore (2015) simulate the cross-border e¤ects of capacity mechanisms within a two-
country numerical model. The purpose is to examine how di¤erent types of capacity mechanisms
with exogenous properties a¤ect investment distortions arising from di¤erences in market power
between countries. Both countries choose reliability options in equilibrium under the parameters
of the model, and this equilibrium welfare dominates energy-only markets. The present paper
employs a competitive model to endogenize the size of the capacity reserves and analyze the
magnitude of the missing money problem in equilibrium. I derive exact conditions under which
capacity reserves are upward- or downward distorted relative to the social optimum depending
on two opposing forces: the portfolio e¤ect and cost e¢ ciency e¤ects of market integration. I
also extend the analysis in a number of new directions by endogenizing market integration and
considering nancial contracting and di¤erent allocation rules for capacity reserves.
Structure of the paper Section 2 presents the model and explores the basic trade-o¤ asso-
ciated with capacity reserves in the two polar cases of national electricity markets and perfect
market integration. The intermediary case of partial market integration and the consequences
of decentralized policy making for equilibrium capacity reserves and network investment are an-
alyzed in Sections 3 and 4. Section 5 introduces nancial markets. Section 6 considers national
allocation rules for capacity reserves. Finally, Section 7 concludes with some policy implications.
2 Capacity reserves in national or perfectly integrated markets
There are two countries, identical in terms of consumer preferences, income and production
technologies. The benchmark model encompasses two polar degrees of market structure. The
rst case, indexed by N , is that of autarchy by which electricity markets are entirely national.
Instead, there are transmission lines with su¢ cient capacity to equalize the electricity price
across the two countries in the second case of perfect market integration, indexed by I. I
consider the intermediary case of partial market integration in Section 3.
10See also European Commission (2016).
11Joskow and Tirole (2007) discuss capacity reserves in relation to an exogenous price cap in the spot market.
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2.1 The model
Demand There are two types of representative consumers: households and an electricity
intensive industry. Households pay the expected (long-run) wholesale price of electricity E[~p].
Their consumption qh therefore is independent of short-term price uctuations and chosen to
maximize quasi-linear utility u(qh) + q0 subject to the budget constraint E[~p]qh + q0 + T  Y0,
where q0 is a numeraire good, T is a xed fee, and Y0 represents income. Let u() be twice
continuously di¤erentiable, strictly increasing in the relevant domain and strictly concave, and
assume that income Y0 is large enough that the demand for both goods is strictly positive.
A representative energy intensive industry pays the short-run price ~p and converts each MWh
of electricity one-for-one into a good sold in the international market at price  > 0 net of other
variable operating costs. Energy intensive industries depend on stable production conditions to
run e¢ ciently and therefore cannot respond to short-term price increases by reducing electricity
consumption. I therefore assume that the industry has inelastic demand for qn  0 MWh
electricity independently of ~p. In particular, the industry su¤ers an operating loss if ~p > . Its
surplus then equals qn(   ~p   B(~p   )). The term B() represents the shadow cost of the
loss, which is continuously di¤erentiable, increasing and convex for all ~p > , with B(~p   ) =
B0(0) = 0 for all ~p  . The asymmetry between prots and losses could stem for instance from
liquidity constraints or from prot taxes that treat operating gains and losses asymmetrically,
i.e. losses are not fully deductible. B() represents a negative externality that creates a demand
for capacity reserves to reduce price risk. One would expect the industry also to hedge risk in
the nancial market or through long-term contracts. I consider nancial contracting in Section
5. For now, it is su¢ cient to note that the analysis under nancial contracting is qualitatively
the same as below and in Sections 3 and 4 under the plausible assumption of risk aversion on
both the buyer and the seller side, as in the seminal contribution by Bessembinder and Lemmon
(2002). The assumption that only household demand is long-run price sensitive is for simplicity.
Supply Electricity is competitively supplied in the short and the long-run. Let c(x) be
the variable cost (fuel cost, variable O&M) of producing the xth MWh of thermal electricity in
the country, a cost that is strictly increasing, convex and continuously di¤erentiable. There is
also a capital cost of installing thermal capacity that for simplicity is assumed to be constant
and equal to  > 0 per MWe.
Renewable output (r1; r2) 2 [0; r]2 in the two countries is intermittent (stochastic) and jointly
distributed with cumulative distribution function F (r1; r2) and density f(r1; r2). Renewable
production is symmetric, meaning f(r1; r2) = f(r2; r1) in the entire domain. Let the marginal
distribution be FN (r), with density fN (r) =
R r
0 f(r; ~r)d~r. Denote by FI(r) the distribution of
the average renewable output r = r1+r22 :
FI(r) =
( R 2r
0 FN (2r   ~r)fN (~r)d~r for r 2 [0; r=2]
1  R r2r r(1  FN (2r   ~r))fN (~r)d~r for r 2 [r=2; r].
Renewable electricity production has zero marginal production cost. The capacity is politically
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determined, so I treat it as exogenous throughout. Gains from electricity trade arise in a perfectly
integrated market even if countries are ex ante symmetric insofar as renewable outputs r1 and
r2 are imperfectly correlated.
Short-run equilibrium Assume that the market-based thermal capacity x (i.e. excluding any
capacity reserve) is the same in both countries. The equilibrium price of electricity is implicitly
dened by the market-clearing condition c 1(~p) + r = qh + qn = q if renewable output is large
enough, where r indicates the renewable output in the representative country when electricity
markets are national. If x < q, then there is no market clearing price for low realizations of
renewable output. I assume that the wholesale price is set at a price cap p if the market fails to
clear. Hence,
~p(q   r) =
(
c(q   r) 8r  q   x
p 8r < q   x, (1)
identies the short-term price of electricity.12 The price cap p is endogenous, but has no impli-
cations in the short-run besides redistributing income between consumers and electricity pro-
ducers. Its importance will be apparent through its e¤ects on long-run demand and investment
in thermal capacity.
Long-run equilibrium The long-run household demand DM (p) and the market-based in-
vestment level XM (p) in thermal capacity depend on the market structure M = N; I because
the relevant distribution of renewable output does so. The point at which the marginal utility
of electricity consumption equals the expected price denes the equilibrium household demand:
u0(DM ) =
R r
DM+qn XM c(DM + qn   r)dFM (r) + pFM (DM + qn  XM ). (2)
The corresponding market-based investment level in thermal capacity equates the expected
scarcity rent of the marginal capacity with the marginal capital cost:
(p  c(XM ))FM (DM + qn  XM ) = . (3)
Demand is decreasing and market-based thermal investment is increasing in the price cap p; see
Appendix A.1.
Capacity reserves The market-based supply of thermal capacity is insu¢ cient to cover de-
mand for low realizations of renewable output, i.e. whenever r < DM (p) + qn  XM (p), for any
nite price cap p. To maintain system stability, the system operator can either activate capacity
reserves, or, if that option has been exhausted, disconnect consumers. If system balance were to
be attained entirely by curtailment, this would yield a disconnection (loss of load) probability
equal to FM (DM (p) + qn   XM (p)) > 0. I assume that it is politically unacceptable for sys-
12The discontinuity of the short term price at r = q   x creates some uninteresting technical problems. The
ndings in the main text are limit results of a perturbed model where the wholesale price is continuous in r; see
Appendix A.1 for the details.
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tem operators to deliberately disconnect consumers. The remaining solution then is to procure
enough capacity reserves that curtailment will not occur.
Under the assumption of national electricity markets, pN = PN (k) dened by
DN ( PN ) + qn  XN ( PN ) = k
represents the smallest price cap that would generate precisely enough market-based investment
to ensure that total thermal capacity equals total demand given the national capacity reserve
k. For any price cap above PN (k), there would be overinvestment and under-utilization of the
capacity reserve. Conversely, there would not be enough capacity in the market to cover demand
in all possible contingencies for a price cap below PN (k).
Denote by k = k1+k22 the average capacity reserve under perfect market integration, where
(k1; k2) are the capacity reserves in the two countries. The price cap pI = PI(k) dened by
DI( PI) + qn  XI( PI) = k
is the smallest one required to generate enough market-based investment to ensure security
of supply in the integrated market given the average capacity reserve k.13 ;14 I assume that
the activated capacity reserve is divided equally among the two countries under scarcity, i.e.
whenever r = r1+r22 < k. This allocation rule is ex post e¢ cient here because it equates the
marginal thermal costs across the two countries. The price cap is smaller when the capacity
reserve is larger under both market structures M = N; I:
P 0M (k) =
1
D0M ( PM (k)) X 0M ( PM (k))
< 0.
For future reference, let
kM = DM () + qn  XM () > 0 (4)
be the minimal capacity reserve necessary to fully protect the electricity intensive industry from
losses under market structure M .
Most wholesale electricity markets feature a bid cap above which the market participants
cannot submit bids or o¤ers. In some markets, this bid cap is set at VOLL.15 The price cap
analyzed in this paper is the one implied by the target loss of load probability (which is zero)
and the size of the capacity reserve, and can be substantially smaller than the bid cap. Hence,
13 In the present context, the price cap PM (k) is implicitly dened by the size of the capacity reserve. Alterna-
tively, one can consider an explicit price cap p and an implied capacity reserve KM (p) = DM (p) + qn  XM (p).
The two approaches are formally equivalent in a national electricity market, but may have di¤erent implications
in an integrated market because of strategic interaction.
14One could instead specify a target loss of load of load probability   0. Within this more general framework,
DM ( PM ) + qn  XM ( PM ) = k + F 1M () characterizes the price cap PM (k; ) that for a capacity reserve k yields
precisely enough market-based investment in thermal capacity to generate a loss of load probability  under
market structure M . Actual s are very small. For instance, an annual loss of load probability of 0:1 days implies
 < 0:0003. For simplicity, I let  = 0, such that PM (k) = PM (k; 0).
15Examples include ERCOT (Texas) and NEM (Eastern and Southern Australia).
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situations may occur in which capacity reserves are activated at prices below VOLL and without
there being any substantial risk of rolling blackouts.16
For renewable output r  k, there is enough thermal output o¤ered at market terms to
clear the market at the short-term marginal cost. If renewable output falls below the critical
level r < k, then it becomes necessary to invoke some of the capacity reserve to avoid supply
shortage. In this case, the capacity reserve is bid into the market at the price cap. Hence, the
short-term price of electricity can be characterized by
pM (r; k) =
(
c(xM (k) + k   r) 8r  k
PM (k) 8r < k
(5)
as a function of renewable output r and the capacity reserve k, where xM (k) = XM ( PM (k)) is
the market-based thermal capacity, and r and k represent averages across the two countries if
markets are perfectly integrated.
Henceforth, I make the simplifying assumption that
c(xM (k)) <  8k > 0. (6)
This assumption implies that the electricity intensive industry earns an operating prot under
normal market conditions, i.e. as long as the market clears at the marginal thermal production
cost. In other words, the industry runs into protability problems only in situations of supply
scarcity, i.e. when r < k.
Because of the price cap, the income generated in the market is insu¢ cient to cover the
production cost of the capacity reserves. Additional capacity payments must therefore be put
in place in order to ensure supply security whenever the (average) production of renewable
electricity falls below k. The capacity payments are assumed to be lump-sum and will not play
any role in what follows. For the sake of completeness, I derive the least cost capacity payments
in Appendix A.2.
Household, industry and producer surplus As the industrys marginal utility of income
is larger than that of the households, it is socially optimal that households nance the entire
capacity payment in this model (which is also technically convenient and politically plausible).
Letting qM (k) = DM ( PM (k))+qn denote consumption in the representative country as a function
of the (average) capacity reserve k, the expected consumer surplus becomes
CSM (k)  TM (k) = u(qM (k)  qn) + qn 
Z r
0
pM (r; k)dFM (r)qM (k)
 qnB( PM (k)  )FM (k)  TM (k).
16Sweden is an illustrative case in point. It has not experienced even a single hour of curtailment since liber-
alization of its electricity market in 1996. Nor has the electricity price ever hit the bid cap of 2000 Euro/MWh
during this period. Yet, the system operator has intervened on a number of occasions, most recently during the
cold winter of 2009-10. This pattern is consistent with security of supply being dened also in terms of avoiding
very high prices instead of only averting curtailment. Naturally, there have been several uncontrolled blackouts
in Sweden, the most severe of which was the consequence of Hurricane Gudrun in 2005.
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The terms on the rst row above are the gross utility of electricity consumption minus the
expected payments. The rst term on the second row is the expected shadow cost of the industry
loss. The nal term is the capacity payment TM (k). The optimal capacity reserve features a
trade-o¤ between insurance and e¢ ciency, but is nonetheless di¤erent from a standard moral
hazard problem: it is the electricity intensive industry that is exposed to price risk, but the
households that pay the insurance cost in terms of the capacity payment.
An increase in the capacity reserve reduces the expected price of electricity. The rst term
below is the direct benet of redistributing income from the power producers to consumers (the
quantity e¤ect is of second-order importance):
CS0M (k) =  qM (k)
Z r
0
@pM (r;k)
@k dFM (r) + SSM (k; ).
The second term is the marginal expected security of supply (see Appendix A.8 for the details):
SSM (k; ) =  qnB0( PM (k)  )FM (k) P 0M (k)  qnB( PM (k)  )fM (k)q0M (k). (7)
One the one hand, an increase in the capacity reserve reduces the maximal price, which tends to
increase the security of supply. On the other hand, a larger capacity reserve crowds out market-
based investment in thermal capacity and thereby increases the probability that the market
cannot clear, which tends to reduce the security of supply. Because of crowding out, a higher
capacity reserve need not necessarily be associated with a higher expected security of supply.17
The corresponding expected prot of the electricity producers equals
M (k) + TM (k) =
Z r
0
[pM (r; k)qM (k) 
Z qM (k) r
0
c(~r)d~r]dFM (r)  qM (k) + TM (k).
The marginal e¤ect
0M (k) = qM (k)
Z r
0
@pM (r;k)
@k dFM (r)   M (k)q0M (k)
on generation prot of increasing the capacity reserve is negative, excluding the e¤ect on the ca-
pacity payment. Besides redistributing income to the consumers, the price reduction also drives
a wedge between the marginal long-run cost of thermal capacity and the marginal willingness
to pay for electricity. The second term is the marginal ine¢ ciency associated with this price
distortion:
 M (k) =  +
R r
0 (c(qM (k)  r)  pM (r; k))dFM (r)
=
R k
0 [c(qM (k)  r)  c(qM (k)  k)]dFM (r) > 0.
(8)
Instead of underinvesting relative to the competitive equilibrium, as would be the case under
imperfect competition, the power industry is actually overinvesting (in terms of the sum of
market-based investment and the capacity reserve). Overinvestment relative to the competitive
17However, I show in Appendix A.8 that the price e¤ect dominates crowding-out, at least for su¢ ciently small
capacity reserves.
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equilibrium creates a markdown,  M (k). This price distortion is, moreover, increasing in the
size of the capacity reserve
 0M (k) =
Z k
0
[c0(qM (k)  r)q0M (k) + c0(qM (k)  k)(1  q0M (k))]dFM (r) > 0
because q0M (k) 2 (0; 1); see equation (25) in Appendix A.1.
2.2 The socially optimal capacity reserve
Aggregate welfare in the representative country is the sum of consumer and producer surplus as
a function of the domestic capacity reserve k when electricity markets are national. The capacity
payment merely represents a lump-sum transfer between households and electricity producers
and therefore has no bearing on aggregate welfare in this model (hence, it is not important for
the welfare analysis that the capacity market is fully competitive as long as the capacity reserve
is dispatched in an e¢ cient manner). Symmetry, full price equalization, e¢ cient dispatch of the
capacity reserve and lump-sum capacity payments imply that the welfare is the same in both
countries under perfect market integration and a function of the average capacity reserve k.
Hence, the welfare in the representative country can be written as
WM (k) = CSM (k) + M (k)
for both market structures M = N; I.
I assume throughout that the problem of optimizing the capacity reserve is well-behaved
under both market structures:18
W 00N (k) < 0 8k 2 (0; 2 maxfkN ; kIg],
W 00I (k) < 0 8k 2 (0;maxfkN ; kIg],
limk!0W 0M (k) > 0, M = N; I.
(9)
Solving the rst-order condition yields the following result (the proof is in Appendix A.3):
Proposition 1 Assume that electricity markets are either national or perfectly integrated. The
socially optimal capacity reserve kfbM 2 (0; kM ) under market structure M = N; I entails a
trade-o¤ between the marginal benet of increased security of supply against the marginal cost
of distorting consumption and investment:
SSM (k
fb
M ; ) =  M (k
fb
M )q
0
M (k
fb
M ). (10)
The social optimum can be implemented as a pay-o¤ dominant Nash equilibrium under both mar-
ket structures if countries set capacity reserves non-cooperatively to maximize domestic welfare.
The assumption that capacity reserves are set by policy makers in each country in a decentral-
18Appendix A.8 shows that assumption (9) is satised for kN and kI su¢ ciently small under reasonable as-
sumptions on fM (), B() and u().
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ized and non-cooperative manner does not necessarily represent any large source of ine¢ ciency.
Each country de facto internalizes the welfare e¤ect abroad in their choice of capacity reserve
in case of symmetry, perfect market integration and if capacity reserves are allocated in an ex
post e¢ cient manner.
Comparative statics The trade-o¤ facing policy makers is qualitatively the same indepen-
dently of whether electricity markets are national of perfectly integrated. However, the mag-
nitudes of the marginal e¤ects di¤er between the two market structures. On the one hand, a
fully integrated electricity market allows for a more e¢ cient use of a given total capacity reserve
k1 +k2 because reserves can be activated in such a manner as to increase e¢ ciency by equalizing
marginal thermal production costs across countries. This cost e¢ ciency of market integration
can be represented as the ratio of the expected cost distortion under market integration over
the expected cost distortion when markets are national,
 I(k)
 N (k)
, (11)
and tends to increase the socially optimal capacity reserve under full market integration relative
the case when electricity markets are national.
On the other hand, the probability of a shortage of renewable electricity is relatively smaller
under market integration because of trade and the imperfect correlation of renewable output.
This portfolio e¤ect of market integration can be represented as the adjusted probability that
the capacity reserve is invoked under market integration relative to the adjusted probability that
it is invoked in the national market,
FI(k)
B0( PI(k) )
D0I( PI(k))
+B( PI(k)  )fI(k)
FN (k)
B0( PN (k) )
D0N ( PN (k))
+B( PN (k)  )fN (k)
, (12)
and tends to reduce the socially optimal capacity reserve under full market integration relative
the case when electricity markets are national.19 The e¤ect of market integration on the socially
optimal capacity reserve depends on the relative magnitudes of those two e¤ects (the proof is in
Appendix A.4):
Proposition 2 The socially optimal capacity reserve is larger under perfect market integra-
tion compared to the case when electricity markets are national (kfbI > k
fb
N ) if cost e¢ ciency
dominates the portfolio e¤ect of market integration:
 I(k)
 N (k)
<
FI(k)
B0( PI(k) )
D0I( PI(k))
+B( PI(k)  )fI(k)
FN (k)
B0( PN (k) )
D0N ( PN (k))
+B( PN (k)  )fN (k)
, k 2 fkfbN ; kfbI g. (13)
The opposite result holds if the inequality is reversed so that the portfolio e¤ect dominates.
19 If, for instance c(x) = cx, and (r1; r2) are stochastically independent with distribution FN (r) = rr , then
 I (k)
 N (k)
= 2
3
2k
r
and FI (k)
FN (k)
= 2k
r
are both below unity for k  kM  r2 .
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3 Capacity reserves in partially integrated markets
The analysis has so far relied on assumptions that markets either are entirely national or perfectly
integrated. This section allows markets to be partially integrated in the sense that there is trade
between them, but trade ows are sometimes restricted.
3.1 Model extension
The analysis of electricity markets under transmission constraints is notoriously di¢ cult, espe-
cially under the assumption of strategic interaction among players. One reason is that optimal
behavior is discontinuous at trading volumes around which the constraint is just binding; see
Holmberg and Philpott (2012) and references therein. To maintain tractability of the model
while still capturing the avour of network constraints, I assume that the transmission network
has enough installed capacity to handle all trade ows, but the network breaks down with proba-
bility 1  2 [0; 1]. If this happens, markets are completely separated and thus become entirely
national. Instead, the market is fully integrated if the transmission network operates at full
capacity. Under this simplied structure,  is a measure of market integration. While obviously
a technical simplication, there is a grain of truth to this way of modeling networks because
transmission capacity sometimes is reduced for scheduled or unscheduled maintenance reasons.
I also make a small reinterpretation of the time frame of the model. The analysis in Section
2 was cast in terms of the long-term problem of ensuring enough thermal investment to cover
demand while simultaneously avoiding price spikes. Many countries in the EU actually are in
a situation of overcapacity (European Commission, 2016). Instead, renewable production has
driven down prices so far that the expected market revenue is insu¢ cient to cover the xed costs
of keeping thermal capacity available for the spot market. Assume now that  is the xed cost
of keeping a unit of thermal capacity available and c() its variable production cost. Consider
the intermediary problem of keeping enough thermal capacity online to ensure supply security.
The timing of the game is as follows. The policy makers in the two countries procure
capacity reserves (k1; k2) in the rst stage. Network reliability is realized, subsequent to which
the markets are either perfectly integrated or national. Consumers decide how much electricity
to purchase and power producers how much thermal capacity to make available to the short-term
market depending on the market structure M = N; I. Finally, renewable output is realized in
the two countries. The real-time wholesale market clears all prices if renewable output and/or
transmission capacity is su¢ cient to handle the residual ow of electricity between markets.
Otherwise capacity reserves are activated in one or both markets.20 ;21
20An alternative timing would be to assume that consumers and power producers make their choices prior to
the revelation of market structure. Demand and thermal supply in each country would then depend on the full
range of price caps (pN1; pN2; pI). The trade-o¤ facing policy makers would remain qualitatively intact, but the
analysis of decentralized policy making would be obscured by an intractability of second-order conditions.
21One could also maintain a long-term framework and assume that network owners with probability  make an
incremental investment to remove bottlenecks. I endogenize  in Section 4.
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The expected welfare in country i simply becomes the weighted average
W (ki; kj) = WI(k) + (1  )WN (ki) (14)
under this structure, where k = ki+kj2 represents the average capacity reserve. The corresponding
expected welfare equalsW (k; k) in the representative country under symmetric capacity reserves,
k1 = k2 = k.
3.2 Equilibrium capacity reserves
Consider the social optimum as a benchmark. The rst-best optimal capacity reserve kfb()
is symmetric and trades-o¤ the marginal e¤ect in the integrated market against the marginal
e¤ect when markets are national:
W 0I(k
fb) + (1  )W 0N (kfb) = 0. (15)
Now let policy makers in each country set their capacity reserves non-cooperatively to max-
imize the domestic welfare W (ki; kj). The rst-order condition becomes
@W (ki; k
)
@ki
jki=k = 12W 0I(k) + (1  )W 0N (k) = 0 (16)
in symmetric equilibrium, k1 = k2 = k(). Whereas an electricity market with zero or full
integration generates the e¢ cient outcome in the present model, the market with partial inte-
gration does not. By comparing equilibrium condition (16) with the optimality condition (15), it
is quite obvious that the decentralized (non-cooperative) equilibrium generally will be ine¢ cient
because the policy maker in the home country does not take into account the marginal e¤ect
W 0I(k)=2 abroad of expanding the capacity reserve at home. What is less clear, is whether
decentralized policy making leads to upward or downward distortions of the capacity reserve
under partial market integration.
To evaluate the e¤ects of decentralized policy making, consider the symmetric capacity
reserve k1 = k2 = (t; ) implicitly dened by the solution to
1+t
2 W
0
I() + (1  )W 0N () = 0. (17)
The parameter t measures the degree to which policy makers internalize the externality abroad
of changes in the domestic capacity reserve. Policy makers internalize the full e¤ect if t = 1,
in which case the rst-best solution obtains: (1; ) = kfb(). The non-cooperative solution
obtains in the opposite case when policy makers do not internalize any of the e¤ects abroad:
(0; ) = k().
The di¤erence between the socially optimal capacity reserve and the non-cooperative solution
equals
kfb   k = R 10 @(t; )@t dt = R 10 W 0I((t; )) [(1 + t)W 00I ((t; )) + 2(1  )W 00N ((t; ))]dt. (18)
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The denominator of (18) is strictly positive by assumption (9). Hence, decentralized policy
making leads to downward (upward) distortions in the equilibrium capacity reserve if the foreign
externality is positive (negative), which is very intuitive. The sign of the externality in turn
depends on the relative strengths of the marginal e¤ects of market integration:
Lemma 1 The foreign externality is positive [negative] if cost e¢ ciency is stronger [weaker]
than the portfolio e¤ect of market integration (W 0I((t; )) > [<]0 for all t 2 [0; 1] and  2 (0; 1]
if inequality (13) is satised [violated]).
Proof. Assume that (t; ) 2 [0; 1]  [0; 1). Strict quasi-concavity of WI(k) and WN (k) imply
1+t
2 W
0
I(k) + (1   )W 0N (k) > (<)0 for all k < minfkfbN ; kfbI g (k > maxfkfbN ; kfbI g). Hence,
(t; ) 2 [minfkfbN ; kfbI g;maxfkfbN ; kfbI g]. If inequality (13) is satised [violated], then (t; ) 2
[kfbN ; k
fb
I ] [(t; ) 2 [kfbI ; kfbN ]] by Proposition 2. Strict quasi-concavity of WI(k) then implies
W 0I((t; )) > [<]0 if inequality (13) is satised [violated].
A marginal increase in the domestic capacity reserve increases the security of supply even
abroad in an integrated market, but the lower price cap exacerbates the distortions to con-
sumption and investments abroad. The marginal distortion owing to an increase in the capacity
reserve is small (large) in magnitude compared to the supply security e¤ect if the cost e¢ ciency
of market integration is strong (weak). The foreign externality is positive (negative) in this case.
To summarize (the proof is in Appendix A.5):
Proposition 3 Assume that the electricity markets are partially integrated,  2 (0; 1), and that
the countries choose capacity reserves non-cooperatively to maximize domestic welfare. The ca-
pacity reserve k() 2 [minfkfbN ; kfbI g;maxfkfbN ; kfbI g] in the unique symmetric equilibrium solves
1
2SSI(k
; ) + (1  )SSN (k; ) = 12 I(k)q0I(k) + (1  ) N (k)q0N (k). (19)
The equilibrium capacity reserve is downward [upward] distorted if cost e¢ ciency dominates [is
dominated by] the portfolio e¤ect of market integration (k() < [>]kfb() if  2 (0; 1) and
inequality (13) is satised [violated]).
4 Network investment to increase market integration
The price spikes associated with losses in renewable output can be mitigated either by means of
capacity reserves or by market integration. Capacity reserves achieve this by imposing an implicit
cap on the price of electricity that incites su¢ cient thermal capacity to cover consumption.
Under market integration, output reductions in one country can be alleviated by increased
production in other markets, thereby increasing productive e¢ ciency and limiting price increases.
Because of the price caps, the market provides insu¢ cient incentives to invest in thermal ca-
pacity and therefore has to be complemented by a mechanism that generates additional capacity
payments. But the market also provides insu¢ cient incentives for improving network reliability.
Network owners typically earn their income from buying electricity at a low price in one area
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and selling it at a higher price in another when network constraints prevent all areas in the
market from clearing at a single price. Unfortunately, the market generates no such congestion
rent here. Either the transmission network is fully operational, in which case the market is
integrated and there are no price di¤erences, or the network is completely down, in which case
there is no trade between the countries. The lack of protability is particularly visible in the
present context, but applies more broadly to the problem of investing in network reliability. To
account for this "missing money" problem in network reliability, I assume that the transmis-
sion networks are regulated. I consider both the case when regulation of network investment is
centralized and when network investment is decentralized to the individual countries along with
the choice of capacity reserves.
4.1 Centralized network investment
Under centralized network regulation, total reliability I is chosen to maximize the expected
total welfare
2IWI(k) + (1  I)(WN (k1) +WN (k2))  2C(pI)
across the two countries, taking the capacity reserves (k1; k2) as given and subject to the twice
continuously di¤erentiable, increasing and strictly convex cost function C(), where assumptions
that C
00(y)y
C0(y) > 1 for all y > 0, limy!0C
0(y)=y < WI(k
fb
N )  WN (kfbN ) and C 0(1)=2 > WI(kfbI )  
WN (k
fb
I ) ensure existence of an interior solution. Each country chooses its capacity reserve to
maximize the domestic welfare, taking network reliability I and the capacity reserve in the
other country as given.
The optimal degree RI(k) of network reliability under centralized regulation is a trade-o¤
between the marginal value of market integration and the marginal cost of increasing network
reliability
WI(k) WN (k) = C
0(
p
RI)
2
p
RI
as a function of the symmetric capacity reserve k1 = k1 = k.
The equilibrium degree of market integration I(t) is implicitly characterized by the solution
to I = RI((t; I)) as a function of the degree t to which policy makers internalize the foreign
externality of capacity reserves. The rst-best degree of market integration satises fb = I(1),
whereas the equilibrium degree of market integration equals I = I(0). Hence,
fb   I =
R 1
0 
0
I(t)dt =
R 1
0
R0I((t; I(t)))
@(t;I(t))
@t
1 R0I((t; I(t)))@(t;I(t))@
dt
measures the e¤ect on market integration of decentralizing the choice of capacity reserves under
centralized network regulation. The denominator of the fraction is positive in stable equilibrium
(Dixit, 1986). By
R0I() =
(1 + t)I + 2(1  I)
1  I
2
3
2
IW
0
I()
C 00(
p
I)
p
I   C 0(pI) ,
17
an increase in the capacity reserve tends to increase the marginal value of market integration
and drive up network investment if the foreign externality is positive. Capacity reserves and
market integration are strategic complements in this case. Instead, capacity reserves and market
integration are strategic substitutes if the foreign externality is negative. Whether equilibrium
capacity reserves are above or below the social optimum under decentralized policy making also
depends on the magnitudes of the two e¤ects of market integration, see (18). Multiplying the
two e¤ects yields
R0I()
@
@t
=
2
5
2
I
(1+t)I+2(1 I)
1 I
C 00(
p
I)
p
I   C 0(pI)
(W 0I())
2
 [(1 + t)IW 00I ((t; )) + 2(1  I)W 00N ()]
> 0,
and the following result becomes immediately obvious:
Proposition 4 Market integration is unambiguously downward distorted if network investment
is centralized and the countries choose capacity reserves non-cooperatively (I < 
fb in stable
equilibrium).
A decentralized choice of capacity reserves at the individual country level has an unambiguous
e¤ect on market integration, despite the ambiguous e¤ect on capacity reserves. Capacity reserves
are downward distorted if the cost e¢ ciency of market integration is comparatively strong, which
in turn leads to a downward distortion of network investment by strategic complementarity.
Instead, capacity reserves are upward distorted if the portfolio e¤ect of market integration is
comparatively strong, which again leads to a downward distortion of network investment, this
time by strategic substitutability.
4.2 Decentralized network investment
Assume now that the two countries invest in domestic network reliability (y1; y2) in a non-
cooperative manner. The total network reliability becomes y1y2 under the assumption that
network reliability is stochastically independent across the two countries. The welfare in country
i then equals
W (ki; kj ; yi; yj) = yiyjWI(k) + (1  yiyj)WN (ki)  C(yi)
as a function of the capacity reserves (ki; kj) and network reliability (yi; yj).
Country is welfare function is not necessarily quasi-concave in the domestic policy variables
(ki; yi) although it is quasi-concave in each of the two arguments ki and yi. To circumvent
any existence problems caused by non-concavity, I assume that ki and yi are decentralized
to di¤erent policy makers in country i and chosen independently of one another. Any Nash
equilibrium under a coordinated choice of (ki; yi) is contained in the set of Nash equilibria under
a non-cooperative choice of ki and yi.
The total network reliability RN (k) = y2N (k) under decentralized network investment is
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characterized by the solution to
WI(k) WN (k) = C
0(
p
RN )p
RN
in interior symmetric equilibrium for a symmetric capacity reserve k1 = k2 = k.22 The equilib-
rium degree of market integration N (t) under decentralized network investment is implicitly
characterized by the solution to N = RN ((t; N )) as a function of the degree t to which policy
makers internalize the foreign externality of capacity reserves.
By following the same procedure as in the case of centralized network investment, it is easy
to verify that market integration is smaller when domestic policy makers fail to internalize the
external e¤ects of capacity reserves compared to the case when all such e¤ects are internalized:
N < N (1). The next question is whether decentralized network investment further accentuates
those distortions, i.e. whether N < 

I . To analyze this question, dene R(k; ) by
WI(k) WN (k) = C
0(
p
R)
(1 + )
p
R
and (t; ) by  = R((t; ); ). By construction, I = (0; 1) and 

N = (0; 0), so that the
di¤erence in network reliability between the two regimes becomes:
I   N =
R 1
0
@(0; )
@
d =
R 1
0
@R((t;);)
@
1  @R((t;);)@k @(t;)@
d .
The denominator is positive in stable equilibrium, so that the e¤ect on market integration is
determined by the direct e¤ect:
@R(; )
@
=
1
1 + 
2C 0(
1
2 )
C 00(
p
)
p
   C 0(p) > 0,
and it follows that:
Proposition 5 Market integration is further downward distorted if both network investment
and capacity reserves are decided non-cooperatively by the two countries compared to the case
when network investment is centralized (N < 

I < 
fb in stable equilibrium).
Domestic investment in network reliability has positive e¤ects abroad because of improved
market integration. A country concerned entirely with the maximization of domestic surplus
neglects these positive external e¤ects, which causes the total network reliability to be smaller
under decentralized than centralized network investment. Hence, the welfare distortions associ-
ated with decentralized decision making are additive in this model.
22Observe that y1 = y2 = 0 constitutes a Nash equilibrium under decentralized network investment because
network reliability is zero independently of yi if yj = 0. I consider the more interesting case of positive market
integration.
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5 Financial markets
Capacity reserves are benecial because they protect consumers against blackouts and nancial
losses by reducing price spikes. An alternative way to hedge price risk would be through a
nancial market. This section investigates how nancial markets interact with the socially
optimal capacity reserves and those that would arise in equilibrium. In particular, would the
distortions associated with decentralized policy making prevail or vanish in a competitive and
well-functioning nancial market?
5.1 Model extension
Let the industry in country i purchase qn call options for one MWh each with strike price s.
Assume that the nancial market is perfectly competitive and that realized gains and losses are
treated symmetrically in the nancial market; the seller is risk neutral and can clear any losses
one for one against other prots. The equilibrium option price in country i then simply equals
the expected option payment:
v(ki; kj ; s) = 
Z r
0
maxfpI(r; k)  s; 0gdFI(r) + (1  )
Z r
0
maxfpN (r; ki)  s; 0gdFN (r)
under partial market integration ( 2 [0; 1] and exogenous).
Financial contracting leaves the prot of the power producers una¤ected. The expected
welfare in country i thus becomes
W (ki; kj ; s) = (CSI(k; s) + I(k)) + (1  )(CSN (ki; s) + N (ki))  qnv(ki; kj ; s),
where
CSM (k; s) = u(qM (k)  qn) 
Z r
0
pM (r; k)dFM (r)qM (k)
+qn
Z r
0
[ minfpM (r; k); sg  B(minfpM (r; k); sg   )]dFM (r)
represents the consumer surplus under market structureM gross of the option cost qnv(ki; kj ; s).23
The corresponding expected welfare in the representative country becomes W (k; s) = W (k; k; s)
under symmetric capacity reserves, k1 = k2 = k.
5.2 Equilibrium capacity reserves vs. the social optimum
Assume that the capacity reserves are symmetric and so small that the option is in the money
when renewable resources are scarce under both market structures, i.e. PI(k) > s and PN (k) > s.
23 It would be appropriate to denote the shadow cost B(minfpM (r; k); sg + v(ki; kj ; s)   ) under nancial
contracting because the electricity intensive industry turns an operating prot if and only if   minfpM (r; k); sg+
v(ki; kj ; s). However, the options are purchased prior to the resolution of any uncertainty and therefore represents
a sunk cost at the production stage. To avoid uninteresting complications, I assume that only the variable part
of the prot represents a shadow cost to the rm.
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The welfare e¤ect of an increase in the capacity reserve equals:
@W (k; s)
@k
=  qnB(s  )[fI(k)q0I(k) + (1  )fN (k)q0N (k)]
  I(k)q0I(k)  (1  ) N (k)q0N (k).
(20)
The sum of the two terms on the second row is the marginal expected distortion of consumption
and investment in a partially integrated market. The term on the rst row is the marginal
insurance e¤ect. It is zero if the strike price is below the industrys break-even price so that the
nancial market already o¤ers complete insurance (B(s   ) = 0 for all s  ). The marginal
insurance e¤ect is strictly negative when the rm is exposed to price risk (s > ). Recall that
the welfare benet of an increase in the capacity reserve works through the reduction in the
maximal price, P 0M (k) < 0, when there are no nancial contracts; see Proposition 1. This
security of supply benet vanishes under option contracting because then it is the strike price
s that marks the maximal price for the electricity intensive industry. The only remaining e¤ect
of the capacity reserve is to crowd out market-based investment in thermal capacity, which
increases the likelihood that the price cannot clear in the market. Crowding-out represents the
rst term in (20) above. Hence, (the proof is in Appendix A.6):
Proposition 6 Assume that consumers can hedge risk by purchasing call options in a com-
petitive nancial market that renders the equilibrium option price equal to the expected option
payment. The socially optimal capacity reserve kfb(; s) is zero for any degree of market inte-
gration  2 [0; 1] and any option strike price s < 1. The social optimum can be implemented
as a pay-o¤ dominant Nash equilibrium if countries set capacity reserves non-cooperatively to
maximize domestic welfare.
Financial markets completely remove the need for capacity reserves because they distort
prices and investments without providing any hedging benets beyond what can be achieved
through nancial contracting alone. The e¢ ciency of energy-only markets does not hinge upon
nancial markets being able to hedge all consumersprice risk (s  ). All that matters is that
the price risk is bounded (s < 1). The expected shadow cost of losses is driven to zero as
capacity reserves become small because the probability FM (k) of supply scarcity vanishes.
There are no ine¢ ciencies associated with decentralized policy making, not even under in-
complete market integration. No country has anything to gain by unilaterally introducing a
capacity market in an energy-only market with nancial contracting because there are no do-
mestic hedging benets to be achieved, only distortions.
Proposition 6 points to at least two reasons why countries would introduce capacity markets
in a market with nancial contracting. Domestic policy makers could have other objectives
than to maximize the sum of domestic consumer and producer surplus. If, for example, the
expected prot of the energy intensive industry weighs more heavily than the other groups in
the economy, a motive for introducing a capacity mechanism would be to push down the expected
option payment and thereby reduce the cost to the industry of nancial contracting.
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An e¢ ciency argument in favour of capacity markets arises in an imperfect nancial market
unable to hedge all risk. There could for instance be volume risk, which I have ignored by
assuming constant demand qn. But there could also be remaining price risk. Assume that the
sellers of nancial contracts cannot diversify away all risk. To facilitate comparison with the
analysis in Section 3, assume that B() now denotes the shadow cost of losses faced by the sellers
of the option contracts, whereas ~B() represents the industrys shadow cost.24 In a competitive
nancial market, the option price equals the expected option payment plus the risk correction:
v(k; k; s) = 
Z r
0
B(maxfpI(r; k)  s; 0g)dFI(r) + (1  )
Z r
0
B(maxfpN (r; k)  s; 0g)dFN (r).
The option price will be very high in an energy-only market if B() is large for large option
payments, even if the nancial market is competitive and despite the option payment being
bounded in expectation.25 Capacity reserves again improve performance in the nancial market
by limiting market participantsexposure to price spikes. The welfare e¤ect of a small increase
in the capacity reserve equals
@W (k; s)
@k
= SSI(k; s) + (1  )SSN (k; s)
 [ I(k) + qn ~B(s  )fI(k)]q0I(k)  (1  )[ N (k) + qn ~B(s  )fN (k)]q0N (k).
This trade-o¤ is qualitatively similar to the one that arises with consumer risk aversion, but no
nancial markets. A minor di¤erence is that the reference price now equals the strike price s
instead of the industry break-even price . If s = , then the solution is exactly the same as in
Proposition 3. Hence, it is only under strong assumptions about the nancial market in terms
of competitiveness and the diversiability of risk that the need for capacity reserves vanishes.
6 National allocation rules for capacity reserves
I have so far assumed that all available capacity reserves are used in an e¢ cient manner under
market integration, independently of where the system is constrained the most. In this section, I
instead assume that countries are responsible for handling their own supply problems separately.
This change is of no consequence in a situation with national markets, because then there would
be no ow of electricity between the countries anyway. For illustration, consider therefore the
opposite polar case of perfect market integration.
In a perfectly integrated market, total consumption q and market-based investment x < q are
identical in the two countries independently of the how supply constraints are handled because
all consumers and producers face identical prices. There is enough thermal capacity to clear the
market if and only if r  q   x. In the opposite case of a supply constrained market, I dene
24Now there is risk aversion both on the seller and buyer side. A su¢ cient condition for gains from trade in the
nancial markets given s >  is ~B(~p  )  ~B(s  ) > B(~p  s) for all ~p > s.
25 It is easy to verify that limk!0 v(k; k; s)   limk!0 u0(qI(k)  qn) + (1  ) limk!0 u0(qN (k)  qn) <1.
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the national supply constraint in country i as
maxfq   x  ri; 0g if r < q   x and rj < q   x
2(q   x)  r1   r2 if r < q   x and rj  q   x.
Country i faces a national supply constraint only if the domestic market-based supply is insuf-
cient to cover the domestic demand: x+ ri < q. If this situation occurs also in country j, then
the domestic excess demand denes the national supply constraint in both countries. If instead
country j has excess supply, x+ rj  q, then the national supply constraint in country i is the
di¤erence between the domestic excess demand and net imports.
The price cap PI(k) of Section 2 was dened to generate precisely enough market-based
thermal investment xI(k) to cover residual demand qI(k)  k in the worst case scenario without
renewable production anywhere and if the two countries have the same capacity reserve, k1 =
k2 = k. If the two countries have chosen di¤erent capacity reserves, k1 6= k2, then PI(k) is still
necessary and su¢ cient to ensure the security of supply in both markets if now k = minfk1; k2g.
The symmetry of demand and market-based thermal investment implies that total thermal
output only depends on k = minfk1; k2g even if k1 6= k2. In this case, there is excess thermal
capacity ki  minfk1; k2g in one country. Importantly, the thermal production
qI(k)  ri if ri < k and rj < k
2qI(k)  xI(k)  ri   rj if r < k and rj  k
xI(k) if r < k and ri  k
in country i displays more variability under a national supply constraint than under an aggregate
supply constraint where thermal production equals qI(k)  r. This variability implies an ine¢ -
ciency because of the convexity of the thermal production cost. The welfare in the representative
country can then be written as
WInat(k) = CSI(k) + I(k)  
I(k)
for symmetric capacity reserves k1 = k2 = k, where 
I(k) represents the production ine¢ ciency
associated with the national supply constraint, and 
0I(k) = !I(k
sb
I )q
0
I(k
sb
I ) > 0 is the corre-
sponding marginal production ine¢ ciency; see equations (26) and (27) in Appendix A.7 for a
characterization and a proof of the following:
Proposition 7 Assume that electricity markets are perfectly integrated, but supply constraints
are dened at the national level. Any constrained socially optimal capacity reserve satises
ksbI < k
fb
I and is characterized by:
SSI(k
sb
I ; ) = [ I(k
sb
I ) + !I(k
sb
I )]q
0
I(k
sb
I ). (21)
The constrained social optimum can be implemented as a pay-o¤ dominant Nash equilibrium if
countries set capacity reserves non-cooperatively to maximize domestic welfare.
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National allocation rules imply that the socially optimal capacity reserve ksbI falls below the
level kfbI that would arise under an e¢ cient dispatch of capacity reserves because the marginal
distortion associated with a capacity reserve is larger in the former case. However, there are
no particular distortions associated with decentralized policy making in the perfectly integrated
market. Symmetry across countries and the fact that the price cap PI(k) is determined by the
minimal capacity reserve k = minfk1; k2g imply that each country internalizes all welfare e¤ects
by the unilaterally optimal choice of capacity reserve.
7 Policy discussion
This paper has studied countriesunilateral incentives for increasing security of supply by means
of capacity reserves and network investment in a two-country model of interconnected electricity
markets with uctuating renewable production. Capacity reserves o¤er consumers protection
against price spikes and running blackouts in situations of renewable production shortfalls, but
also distort long-run investment and consumption decisions in the market. Network reinforce-
ments reduce national supply constraints, but are costly.
A rst nding is that a non-cooperative choice of capacity reserves not necessarily is inef-
cient. National policy makers e¤ectively internalize the foreign externalities if countries are
symmetric, perfectly integrated, and capacity reserves are deployed in an e¢ cient matter. Hence,
necessary conditions for ine¢ cient policy making are country asymmetries and/or imperfectly
integrated markets. This paper emphasizes distortions associated with market integration.
Equilibrium capacity reserves can be too large or too small in an imperfectly integrated mar-
ket depending on the relative magnitude of two cross-border externalities. On the one hand, a
larger foreign capacity reserve benets the home country by improving supply security in the en-
tire market. Free-riding on foreign capacity reserves tends to generate capacity reserves that are
too small. On the other hand, a larger domestic capacity reserve exacerbates consumption and
investment distortions abroad. Such international spill-overs cause excessive capacity reserves.
Because of these ambiguous e¤ects, it is impossible to make general recommendations about
whether countries should be encouraged to increase domestic capacity reserves or discouraged
from doing so. The net e¤ect depends quantitatively on the strength of a portfolio relative to a
cost e¢ ciency e¤ect of market integration.
Network underinvestment is a pervasive problem. First of all, congestion rent is an inap-
propriate measure of the social value of network reinforcements to increase system reliability.
For instance, congestion rents are always zero in the present model independently of network
reliability. Hence, the optimal level of network investment cannot be decided on the basis of
market signals alone. Centralizing the choice of network investment improves matters because
of the positive foreign externalities associated with improved market integration. However, even
a regulation that causes network owners to invest in order to maximize total welfare is insu¢ -
cient if countries choose capacity reserves non-cooperatively. In light of this nding, the current
EU guidelines for cross-border interconnections subject to which (European Union, 2013, p.44)
"[t]he costs for the development, construction, operation and maintenance of projects of com-
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mon interest should in general be fully borne by the users of the infrastructure" are likely to be
suboptimal from a social welfare perspective. One way to reduce the ine¢ ciency of domestically
chosen capacity reserves is to establish a regulation that induces network investors to attach
a stronger weight to the marginal value of increased market integration relative to the cost of
improving the network and thus to overinvest all else equal. This suggests that users should
either pay in excess of the full network costs, or network investment should be subsidized at
central EU level to o¤set the distortions associated with capacity reserves.
A major benet of capacity reserves is to shelter consumers against short-term price spikes
in the market. This benet is reduced if consumers also can hedge price risk in a nancial
market. Financial contracting thus reduces the need for capacity mechanisms. Put di¤erently, a
larger share of the thermal investment necessary to ensure security of supply can be left to the
market if consumers have the possibility to insure themselves against the price spikes necessary
to accomplish this investment. In fact, the optimal capacity reserve is close to zero in the
limit when the nancial market is e¢ cient and able to absorb all price risk.26 A fundamental
property of an e¢ cient market design therefore is the development of an e¢ cient nancial market
(European Commission, 2016). However, this market is more likely to develop if capacity reserves
are in place to protect market participants against extreme prices. Consequently, capacity and
nancial markets are not necessarily substitutes for one another.
The socially optimal and equilibrium capacity reserves are smaller when reserves are deployed
solely to resolve domestic supply constraints, because the marginal thermal production cost
associated with capacity reserves then is higher than necessary. A national perspective on
supply constraints therefore transforms into larger than necessary price spikes to ensure the
security of supply in an integrated electricity market with large shares of renewable production.
Instead, a multinational approach to capacity mechanisms increases e¢ ciency and the security
of supply, for instance a system in which domestic capacity reserves can be invoked so as to
relieve supply security problems abroad.27
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Appendix
A.1 The continuous price extension
Let the short-term price be dened by
~p(q   r) =
8><>:
c(q   r) 8r  q   x
p^(q   r) 8r 2 ((q   x)(1  "); q   x)
p 8r  (q   x)(1  ").
The only di¤erence between this price and (1) in the main text is the inclusion of the twice
continuously di¤erentiable and increasing function p^() in a small interval r 2 ((q x)(1 "); q x).
In particular, p^(x) = c(x) and p^(q"+ x(1  ")) = p. The purpose is to avoid uninteresting and
complicating discontinuities around the point of full capacity utilization, r = q   x. All results
in the main text are limiting results for "! 0.
The optimality conditions
u0(DM ) =
R r
(DM+qn XM )(1 ") ~p(DM + qn   r)dFM (r) + pFM ((DM + qn  XM )(1  ")), (22)R DM+qn XM
(DM+qn XM )(1 ")(p^(DM + qn   r)  p)dFM (r) + (p  c(XM ))FM (DM + qn  XM ) =  (23)
jointly dene the equilibrium household demand DM (p) and market-based investment XM (p).
Straightforward di¤erentiation of the two conditions yields:
D0M (p) =
FM ((DM+qn XM )(1 "))
u00(DM ) 
R r
(DM+qn XM )(1 ") ~p
0(DM+qn r)dFM (r)
< 0,
X 0M (p) =
u00(DM ) 
R r
DM+qn XM c
0(DM+qn r)dFM (r)
c0(XM )FM (DM+qn XM ) D
0
M (p) > 0.
Combine the two market-clearing conditions to get
u0(DM ) =
R r
DM+qn XM c(DM + qn   r)dFM (r) + c(XM )FM (DM + qn  XM ) + .
Hence, the demand in the energy-only market, limp!1DM (p) = D1M > 0, is the solution to
u0(D1M ) =
R r
0 c(D
1
M + qn   r)dFM (r) + ,
whereas the market-based investment level satises X1M = limp!1XM (p) = D
1
M + qn <1.
By the denitions of PM (k) and xM (k) in the main text, I can then solve for the short-term
price as a function of k:
pM (r; k) =
8><>:
c(xM (k) + k   r) 8r  k
p^(xM (k) + k   r) 8r 2 (k(1  "); k)
PM (k) 8r  k(1  ")
(24)
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Straightforward di¤erentiation of qM (k) = DM ( PM (k)) + qn yields
q0M (k) =
c0(xM (k))FM (k)
c0(xM (k))FM (k) +
R r
k c
0(qM (k)  r)dFM (r)  u00(qM (k)  qn)
2 (0; 1). (25)
A.2 Capacity payments
The activated capacity reserve is sold in the wholesale market at the administered price. Hence,
TN (k) =
R k
0 [
R k r
0 c(xN (k) + z)dz   pN (r; k)(k   r)]dFN (r) + k
represents the minimal capacity payment necessary to procure the desired capacity reserve k
and ensure supply security at the price cap PN (k) when electricity markets are national.
The minimal capacity payment necessary to implement a capacity reserve of k in both
countries under perfect market integration is given by
TI(k) =
Z minf2k;rg
maxf2k r;0g
Z 2k r2
0
[
Z k r
0
c(xI(k) + z)dz   pI(r; k)(k   r)]dF (r1; r2)
+
Z maxf2k r;0g
0
Z r
0
[
Z k r
0
c(xI(k) + z)dz   pI(r; k)(k   r)]dF (r1; r2) + k.
The renewable output in country 2 is large enough to clear the market independently of renewable
output in country 1 if r2  minf2k; rg. At the other extreme, the capacity reserve in country
1 is always activated independently of domestic renewable production if r2 < maxf2k   r; 0g.
This possibility is captured by the rst term on the second row above. In the intermediate case,
maxf2k   r; 0g  r2 < minf2k; rg, the capacity reserve in country 1 is activated if and only if
the domestic renewable output is too small: r1 < 2k   r2. This case represents the term on the
rst row above.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 1
Existence and uniqueness Continuity of WM (k) in k and compactness of the domain, k 2
[0; r] imply that a social optimum kfbM exists. Any socially optimal capacity reserve k
fb
M is positive
by the assumption that W 0M (k) > 0 for all k su¢ ciently close to zero. It is also the case that
kfbM  kM because PM (k) <  for all k > kM and any capacity reserve above kM therefore would
serve only to distort consumption and investment further without providing any additional
insurance benets. In fact, kfbM <
kM because
lim
k"kM
W 0M (k) =   M (kM )q0M (kM ) < 0,
see (31). Strict concavity of WM (k) in the domain (0; kM ) implies that the rst-order condition
W 0M (k
fb
M ) = 0 uniquely characterizes the socially optimal capacity reserve, which is approxi-
mately equal to (10) for " close to zero.
28
Implementation. This is trivial when electricity markets are national because then there is
no strategic interaction between the policy makers in the two countries, and assuming that
national policy makers choose the capacity reserve to maximize the domestic welfare. In the
case of perfect market integration, expected welfare in country i equals WI(
ki+k
fb
I
2 )  WI(kfbI )
for all ki 6= kfbI , where the inequality follows from global optimality of kfbI . Hence, choosing a
capacity reserve of ki = k
fb
I is a best-reply for country i to the choice of capacity reserve kj = k
fb
I
in country j 6= i. There could be multiple Nash equilibria, but the one in which both countries
choose kfbI is pay-o¤ dominant because national welfare in both countries is proportional to
aggregate welfare, which is maximized at kfbI .
A.4 Proof of Proposition 2
Let M (k; ) implicitly dened by pM (M ; k) =  for k < kM and by M (k; ) = 0 for k > kM
denote the threshold level of renewable output below which the electricity price rises above .
By the denition of kM in (4) and assumption (6), it follows that M (k; ) 2 (k(1   "); k) if
k < kM . Observe that
W 0I(k)
q0I(k)qn
=
 I(k)
 N (k)
W 0M (k)
q0N (k)qn
+  I(k)H(k)
+B0( PI(k)  )FI(k)  FI(k(1  "))
D0I( PI(k))
   I(k)
 N (k)
B0( PN (k)  )FN (k)  FN (k(1  "))
D0N ( PN (k))
+B( PI(k)  )(fI(k)  fI(k(1  ")))   I(k)
 N (k)
B( PN (k)  )(fN (k)  fN (k(1  ")))
 
Z I(k;)
k(1 ")
B(p^(qI(k)  r)  )f 0I(r)dr +
 I(k)
 N (k)
Z N (k;)
k(1 ")
B(p^(qN (k)  r)  )f 0N (r)drg
for k < minfkN ; kIg, where
H(k) =
1
 N (k)
[B0( PN (k)  ) FN (k)
D0N ( PN (k))
+B( PN (k)  )fN (k)]
  1
 I(k)
[B0( PI(k)  ) FI(k)
D0I( PI(k))
+B( PI(k)  )fI(k)].
H(kfbN ) > 0 and H(k
fb
I ) > 0 if inequality (13) is satised, whereas the terms on the last three
rows of the above expression are negligible for " su¢ ciently close to zero. Assume rst that
kI  kN . As W 0I(kfbI ) = 0, it follows from the above expression that W 0N (kfbI ) < 0. Strict
quasi-concavity of WN then implies k
fb
N < k
fb
I . Assume next that
kN  kI . As W 0N (kfbN ) = 0, it
follows that W 0I(k
fb
N ) > 0. Strict quasi-concavity of WI then implies k
fb
I > k
fb
N . All inequalities
are reversed if inequality (13) is reversed.
A.5 Proof of Proposition 3
Uniqueness Let Z(k; t; ) = 1+t2 W
0
I(k)+(1 )W 0N (k). We already know from Lemma 1 that
any solution Z(; t; ) = 0 must satisfy (t; ) 2 [minfkfbN ; kfbI g;maxfkfbN ; kfbI g] and that there
exists at least one such solution (t; ) for every (t; ) 2 [0; 1]2. Strict concavity of WI(k) and
29
WN (k) in the domain [minfkfbN ; kfbI g;maxfkfbN ; kfbI g] imply that (t; ) is unique. In particular,
there exists a unique symmetric equilibrium candidate k() = (0; ) which is, moreover,
contained in [minfkfbN ; kfbI g;maxfkfbN ; kfbI g].
Existence Assume that kj = k(), and consider country is incentive to deviate from k().
It can never be optimal for i to deviate to ki > 2 maxfkN (); kI()g   k() because then
ki+k
()
2 >
kI and ki > kN so that PI(
ki+k
()
2 ) <  and
PN (ki) < . In this case, country i only
distorts investment and consumption at home without o¤ering any additional insurance benets
to the domestic industry. Next,
@2W (ki; k
)
@k2i
= 14W
00
I (
ki+k
()
2 ) + (1  )W 00N (ki) < 0
for all ki 2 (0; 2 maxfkN ; kIg k()] by assumption (9), and k() 2 (0; 2 maxfkN ; kIg k()]
imply that ki = k() is country is unique best-reply to kj = k().
Characterization The rst-order condition Z(; 0; ) = 0 uniquely characterizes the symmetric
equilibrium k() = (0; ), which is approximately equal to (19) for " close to zero. The
comparative statics follow directly from (18) and Lemma 1.
A.6 Proof of Proposition 6
The social optimum The expected welfare in country i can equivalently be written as
W (ki; kj ; s) = W^ (ki; kj)  qn
Z I(k;)
0
B(minfpI(r; k); sg   )dFI(r)
 qn(1  )
Z N (ki;)
0
B(minfpN (r; ki); sg   )dFN (r),
where
W^ (ki; kj) = [u(qI(k)  qn) + qn 
Z r
0
pI(r; k)dFI(r)qI(k) + I(k)]
+(1  )[u(qN (ki)  qn) + qn 
Z r
0
pN (r; ki)dFN (r)qN (ki) + N (ki)]
denotes the expected welfare gross of the expected shadow cost of losses. At symmetric capacity
reserves k1 = k2 = k:
W^ (k; k) W (k; k; s)  W^ (k; k)  qnB(s  )[FI(I(k; )) + (1  )FN (N (k; ))]
where the rst inequality follows from B(minfpM (r; k); sg   )  0 for all r, and the second
from B(s  )  B(minfpM (r; k); sg   ) for all r. M (k; )  k yields
W (0; 0; s) = W^ (0; 0) = [u(D1I ) + qn 
Z r
0
Z D1I +qn r
0
c(~r)d~rdFI(r)  (D1I + qn)]
+(1  )[u(D1N ) + qn 
Z r
0
Z D1N +qn r
0
c(~r)d~rdFN (r)  (D1N + qn)]
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independently of s. Next,
W (0; 0; s) W (ki; kj ; s) = W^ (0; 0)  W^ (ki; kj) + qn
Z I(k;)
0
B(minfpI(r; k); sg   )dFI(r)
+qn(1  )
Z N (ki;)
0
B(minfpN (r; ki); sg   )dFN (r)
is non-negative for all (ki; kj) because the shadow cost is non-negative and
@W^ (ki; kj)
@ki
=  
2
 I(k)q
0
I(k)  (1  ) N (k)q0N (ki) < 0,
@W^ (ki; kj)
@kj
=  
2
 I(k)q
0
I(k)  0
imply W^ (0; 0)  W^ (ki; kj) for all (ki; kj). W (0; 0; s)  W (ki; kj ; s) for all (ki; kj) implies that
kfb1 (; s) = k
fb
2 (; s) = k
fb(; s) = 0 is the social optimum.
Implementation W (0; 0; s)  W (ki; 0; s) for all ki > 0 implies that k1(; s) = k2(; s) = 0
can be sustained as a Nash equilibrium when the two countries choose capacity reserves non-
cooperatively to maximize domestic welfare. The equilibrium is pay-o¤ dominant by symmetry
and the fact that zero capacity reserves is the rst-best social optimum.
Characterization For completeness, I replicate the marginal welfare expression (20) for s > .
Assume that k1 = k2 = k is su¢ ciently small that PI(k) > s and PN (k) > s. Straightforward
di¤erentiation of W (k; s) yields
@W (k; s)
@k
=  q0I(k)[qn
Z I(k;)
I(k;s)
B0(p^(qI(k)  r)  )p^0(qI(k)  r)dFI(r) +  I(k)]
 (1  )q0N (k)[qn
Z N (k;)
N (k;s)
B0(p^(qN (k)  r)  )p^0(qN (k)  r)dFN (r) +  N (k)],
which is strictly negative. An integration by parts yieldsZ M (k;)
M (k;s)
B0(p^(qM (k)  r)  )p^0(qM (k)  r)dFM (r)
=
Z M (k;)
M (k;s)
B(p^(qM (k)  r)  )f 0M (r)dr +B(s  )fM (M (k; s))
 B(s  )fM (k)
for " close to zero. The approximation holds because k(1   ") < M (k; s) < M (k; ) < k for
PM (k) > s >  implies M (k; )! M (k; s)! k as "! 0. Substituting B(s  )fM (M (k; s))
into @W (k; s)=@k above produces (20).
A.7 Proof of Proposition 7
I rst characterize the di¤erence between the thermal production cost under a national versus
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an aggregate supply constraint:

I(k) =
R minf2k;rg
k
R 2k rj
0 
1I(k; r)dF (ri; rj) +
R k
maxf2k r;0g
R 2k rj
k 
1I(k; r)dF (ri; rj)
+
R maxf2k r;0g
0
R r
k 
1I(k; r)dF (ri; rj) +
R k
0
R k
0 
2I(k; ri; rj)dF (ri; rj)
(26)
for k = k1 = k2 in an integrated market, where

1I(k; r) =
1
2
R 2qI(k) xI(k) 2r
0 c(z)dz +
1
2
R xI(k)
0 c(z)dz  
R qI(k) r
0 c(z)dz

2I(k; ri; rj) =
1
2
R qI(k) ri
0 c(z)dz +
1
2
R qI(k) rj
0 c(z)dz  
R qI(k) r
0 c(z)dz.
(27)
The rules for resolving supply constraints matter if and only if rj < minf2k; rg and ri < 2k  rj
because the market clears supply and demand and delivers e¢ cient dispatch qI(k)   r of the
thermal production in both countries in the other events. The rst three expressions in 
I(k)
cover a situation with an aggregate supply constraint r < k, but either r1  k or r2  k, so
that only the capacity reserve in one country is activated. The nal expression identies the
situation with a national supply constraint in both countries. The two expressions 
1I(k) and

2I(k) are strictly positive by c0(z) > 0 and
1
2(2qI(k)  xI(k)  2r) + 12xI(k) = qI(k)  r = 12(qI(k)  ri) + 12(qI(k)  rj). (28)
The cost distortion is strictly increasing in k: 
0I(k) = !I(k)q
0
I(k) > 0 for k 2 (0; r) because
q0I(k) > 0 and
!I(k) =
R minf2k;rg
k
R 2k rj
0
@
1I(k;r)
@k
1
q0I(k)
dF (ri; rj) +
R k
maxf2k r;0g
R 2k rj
k
@
1I(k;r)
@k
1
q0I(k)
dF (ri; rj)
+
R maxf2k r;0g
0
R r
k
@
1I(k;r)
@k
1
q0I(k)
dF (ri; rj) +
R k
0
R k
0
@
2I(k;ri;rj)
@k
1
q0I(k)
dF (ri; rj)
(29)
is strictly positive for k 2 (0; r). To see this second result, note that
@
2I(k;ri;rj)
@k
1
q0I(k)
= 12c(qI(k)  ri) + 12c(qI(k)  rj)  c(qI(k)  r)
and the rst row of
@
1I(k;r)
@k
1
q0I(k)
= 12c(2qI(k)  xI(k)  2r) + 12c(xI(k))  c(qI(k)  r)
+12 [c(xI(k) + 2(k   r))  c(xI(k))](1 
K0I(pI)
D0I(pI)
)
are both non-negative by weak convexity of c(z) and (28). The expression on the second row of
@
1I
@k
1
q0I
is strictly positive for all r < k because c0(z) > 0 and
1  K0I(pI)
D0I(pI)
= 1 +
R r
k c
0(qI(k) r)dFI(r) u00(qI(k) qn)
c0(xI(k))FI(k)
> 0.
The marginal cost distortion converges to zero as k becomes small: limk!0 
0I(k) = 0. To
see this, note that (35) implies limk!0 q0I(k) = 0 and limk!0(1   K
0
I(pI)
D0I(pI)
)q0I(k) = 1. Hence,
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limk!0
@
1I(k;r)
@k = 0 and limk!0
@
2I(k;ri;rj)
@k = 0.
Social optimum A constrained social optimum ksbI exists by continuity of WInat(k) in k and
compactness of the domain: k 2 [0; r]. Any socially optimal capacity reserve satises ksbI  kI
because a capacity reserve above kI would distort consumption and investment without providing
any additional insurance benets. I next show that ksbI > 0. WInat(k) = WI(k) 
I(k) implies
W 0Inat(k) =  qn
Z r
0
B0(pI(r; k)  )@pI(r;k)@k dFI(r)  ( I(k) + !I(k))q0I(k) (30)
by the denition (29) of !I(k). W 0I(k) > 0 for all k > 0, but su¢ ciently close to zero by
assumption (8), and because limk!0 
0I(k) = 0, it follows that W
0
Inat(k) > 0 for all k > 0,
but su¢ ciently close to zero. Hence, a symmetric capacity reserve is a social optimum only if
W 0Inat(k
sb
I ) = 0, which is approximately equal to (21) for " close to zero.
Comparative statics Strict quasi-concavity of WI(k), and W 0I(k
sb
I ) = W
0
Inat(k
sb
I ) + 

0
I(k
sb
I ) =

0I(k
sb
I ) > 0 imply k
fb
I > k
sb
I .
Implementation The expected welfare in country i equals
WInat(ki; k
sb
I ) = WInat(minfki; ksbI g)  (ki  minfki; ksbI g)
for kj = ksbI . Hence,
WInat(k
sb
I ; k
sb
I ) WInat(ki; ksbI ) = WInat(ksbI ) WInat(ki)  0
for all ki < ksbI because k
sb
I maximizes WInat(k). Furthermore;
WInat(k
sb
I ; k
sb
I ) WInat(ki; ksbI ) = (ki   ksbI ) > 0
for ki > ksbI . Hence, ki = k
sb
I is a best-reply to kj = k
sb
I . The equilibrium is pay-o¤ dominant by
symmetry and the assumption that ksbI is constrained socially optimal under a national supply
constraint.
A.8 Regularity assumptions
This appendix derives su¢ cient conditions for assumption (9) to hold. LetAM (k) =
R M (k;)
0 B(pM (r; k) 
)dFM (r) be the expected shadow cost of operating losses. It is characterized by
AM (k) =
Z M (k;)
k(1 ")
B(p^(qM (k)  r)  )dFM (r) +B( PM (k)  )FM (k(1  "))
for k < kM and by AM (k) = 0 for k  kM . The shadow cost is continuous because M (kM ; ) =
kM (1  ") and B(0) = 0 imply limk"kM ()AM (k) = 0. Under the assumption that k < kM ,
A0M (k) = q
0
M (k)
Z M (k;)
k(1 ")
B0(p^(qM (k) r) )p^0(qM (k) r)dFM (r)+B0( PM (k) )FM (k(1 ")) P 0M (k)
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Using the following integration by partsZ M (k;)
k(1 ")
B0(p^(qM (k)  r)  )p^0(qM (k)  r)dFM (r)
=
Z M (k;)
k(1 ")
B(p^(qM (k)  r)  )f 0M (r) +B( PM (k)  )fM (k(1  "))
I obtain
A0M (k) = B
0( PM (k)  )FM (k(1  ")) P 0M (k) + q0M (k)B( PM (k)  )fM (k(1  "))
+ q0M (k)
R M (k;)
k(1 ") B(p^(qM (k)  r)  )f 0M (r)dr.
(31)
Observe that limk"kM A
0
M (k) = 0 by the additional assumption that B
0(0) = 0. Hence, AM (k)
is continuously di¤erentiable in k. Furthermore, the term on the second row converges to zero
as "! 0 because M (k; ) 2 (k(1  "); k). Hence, the marginal benet of hedging price spikes,
 qnA0M (k), can be written approximately as (7) for " close to zero.
The next task is to evaluate limk!0W 0M (k) =  qn limk!0A0M (k)  limk!0  M (k)q0M (k). To
this end, I make the following assumptions beyond those specied in the main body of the
text: fM () is bounded and twice continuously di¤erentiable, with f 0M () and f 00M () bounded for
M = N; I. Furthermore,
f 0M (k)  0 8k & 0, limk!0 FM (k)fM (k(1 ")) = 0,
lim~p!1B(~p  ) =1, lim~p!1 B
0(~p )
B(~p ) > 0.
(32)
Rewrite  A0M (k) as:
 A0M (k) = q
0
M (k)
FM (k)
B( PM (k)  )fM (k(1  "))
[B0( PM (k) )
B( PM (k) )
FM (k(1 "))
 D0M ( PM (k))
FM (k)
fM (k(1 "))   fM (M (k; ))
FM (k)
fM (k(1 ")) ]
+q0M (k)
R M (k;)
k(1 ") [B( PM (k)  ) B(p^(qM (k)  r)  )]f 0M (r)dr.
(33)
The term on the third row of (33) is non-negative for all k su¢ ciently close to zero by the
assumption that f 0M (r)  0 for all r su¢ ciently close to zero. Consider next the terms inside
the square brackets on the second row of (33). The second term is negative, but vanishes in the
limit as k ! 0 by the assumption that fM (r) is bounded and limk!0 FM (k)fM (k(1 ")) = 0. To evaluate
the rst term inside the square brackets, observe that
FM (k(1  "))
 D0M ( PM (k))
=
R r
k c
0(qM (k)  r)dFM (r) +
R k
k(1 ")p^(qM (k)  r)f 0M (r)dr   u00(qM (k)  qn)
+ PM (k)fM (k(1  "))  c(xM (k))fM (k)
after an integration by parts. Multiplying this expression by FM (k)=fM (k(1   ")) and substi-
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tuting in the optimality condition (23) for market-based investment yields
FM (k(1  "))
 D0M ( PM (k))
FM (k)
fM (k(1  ")) = [
R r
k c
0(qM (k)  r)dFM (r)  u00(qM (k)  qn)] FM (k)
fM (k(1  "))
+
R k
k(1 ")[p^(qM (k)  r)  c(xM (k)]f 0M (r)dr
FM (k)
fM (k(1  "))
+
R k
k(1 ")( PM (k)  p^(qM (k)  r))dFM (r) + 
after simplication. The term on the rst row is positive, the term on the second row is non-
negative for k su¢ ciently close to zero by the assumption that f 0M (r)  0 for all r su¢ ciently
close to zero. The rst term on the third row is also positive. It then follows that
FM (k(1  "))
 D0M ( PM (k))
FM (k)
fM (k(1  ")) >  (34)
for all k su¢ ciently close to zero. By the additional assumption that lim~p!1
B0(~p )
B(~p ) > 0, it
follows that the term inside the square brackets on the second row of (33) is strictly positive
and bounded away from zero for all k su¢ ciently close to zero. Finally, evaluate the terms on
the rst row of (33). From (25), it follows directly that
lim
k!0
q0M (k)
FM (k)
=
c0(K1M )R r
0 c
0(D1M + qn   r)dFM (r)  u00(D1M )
> 0 (35)
and bounded from above. By way of the optimality condition (23) for market-based investment,
it follows that PM (k) > FM (k) + c(xM (k)). Monotonicity of B then implies
lim
k!0
B( PM (k)  )FM (k)  lim
k!0
B(

FM (k)
+ c(xM (k))  )FM (k)
=  lim
k!0
B0(

FM (k)
+ c(xM (k))  ) > 0,
where I have used LHôpitals rule to get the second result. Hence,
lim
k!0
B( PM (k)  ))fM (k(1  ")) = lim
k!0
B( PM (k)  ))FM (k)fM (k(1  "))
FM (k)
=1.
To conclude, limk!0W 0M (k) =  qn limk!0A0M (k) =1 under the additional assumptions (32).
The nal task is to evaluate W 00M (k). In doing so, I will make the following assumptions
additional to (32):
u000(qn)  0,
f 00M (k)  0 8k & 0, limk!0 FM (k(1 "))fM (k)fM (k(1 "))FM (k) <1,
lim~p!1B0(~p  ) =1, lim~p!1 B
00(~p )
B0(~p ) > 0 and su¢ ciently large.
(36)
35
Straightforward di¤erentiation yields
A00M (k) = B
0( PM (k)  )FM (k(1  "))
D0M ( PM (k))
[
B00( PM (k)  )
B0( PM (k)  ) q
0
M (k) P
0
M (k) + q
00
M (k)]
+q0M (k)B
0( PM (k)  )[ d
dk
FM (k(1  "))
D0M ( PM (k))
+ fM (k(1  ")) P 0M (k)]
+B( PM (k)  )[q00M (k)fM (k(1  ")) + (q0M (k))2f 0M (k(1  "))]
+
Z M (k;)
k(1 ")
B(p^(qM (k)  r)  )[q00M (k)f 0M (r) + (q0M (k))2f 00M (r)]dr.
after using an integration by parts similar to the above and collecting terms.
Next, substitute
1
q0M (k)
[
d
dk
FM (k(1  "))
D0M ( PM (k))
+ fM (k(1  ")) P 0M (k)]
= u000(qM (k)  qn) + c0(xM (k))fM (k) +
R k
k(1 ")[ PM (k)  p^(qM (k)  r)]f 00M (r)dr
 R rk c00(qM (k)  r)dFM (r)  [ PM (k)  c(xM (k))]f 0M (k)
into A00M (k) above to get
A00M (k) = B
0( PM (k)  )FM (k(1  "))( P 0M (k))2

B00( PM (k)  )
B0( PM (k)  ) +
q00M (k)
q0M (k) P
0
M (k)
  (D
0
M (
PM (k)))
2
FM (k(1  ")) (
PM (k)  c(xM (k)))[
R r
k c
00(qM (k)  r)dFM (r)
PM (k)  c(xM (k)) + f
0
M (k)]
)
+(q0M (k))
2B0( PM (k)  )[u000(qM (k)  qn)
+c0(xM (k))fM (k) +
R k
k(1 ")( PM (k)  p^(qM (k)  r))f 00M (r)dr]
+B( PM (k)  )[q00M (k)fM (k(1  ")) + (q0M (k))2f 0M (k(1  "))]
+
Z M (k;)
k(1 ")
B(p^(qM (k)  r)  )[q00M (k)f 0M (r) + (q0M (k))2f 00M (r)]dr.
Consider rst the properties of q00M (k). By di¤erentiating (25) and rearranging terms:
q00M (k)
q0M (k)
FM (k)
fM (k)
= 1  q
0
M (k)
FM (k)
FM (k)
fM (k)
(1  q0M (k))c00(xM (k))
R r
k c
0(qM (k)  r)dFM (r)  u00(qM (k)  qn)
c0(xM (k))2
+
q0M (k)
FM (k)
FM (k)
fM (k)
q0M (k)
u000(qM (k)  qn) 
R r
k c
00(qM (k)  r)dFM (r)
c0(xM (k))
The right-hand side of this expression converges to 1 by the assumptions that f 0M (k)  0 8k
su¢ ciently close to zero and limk!0
FM (k)
fM (k(1 ")) = 0. Hence, q
00
M (k) > 0 for all k su¢ ciently close
to zero. This result plus the assumptions that u000  0, f 0M (k)  0 and f 00M (k)  0 for all k
su¢ ciently close to zero imply that the nal four rows of A00M (k) above all are positive for k
su¢ ciently close to zero. The next expression to evaluate is the one in curly brackets in A00M (k).
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By expanding:
q00M (k)
q0M (k) P
0
M (k)
=
q00M (k)
q0M (k)
FM (k)
fM (k)| {z }
i
D0M ( PM (k))
FM (k(1  "))
fM (k(1  "))
FM (k)| {z }
ii
FM (k)
q0M (k)| {z }
iii
FM (k(1  "))fM (k)
fM (k(1  "))FM (k) .| {z }
iv
Term i converges to 1, term ii satises
lim
k!0
D0M ( PM (k))
FM (k(1  "))
fM (k(1  "))
FM (k)
2 [ 1

; 0) (37)
by (34), term iii is bounded from above by (35), and term iv is bounded from above by as-
sumption (36). Hence, limk!0
q00M (k)
q0M (k) P
0
M (k)
is bounded from below and dominated by B
00( PM (k) )
B0( PM (k) )
for k su¢ ciently close to zero if lim~p!1
B00(~p )
B0(~p ) is su¢ ciently large. By expanding the next
expression, I obtain
lim
k!0
(D0M ( PM (k)))
2
FM (k(1  ")) (
PM (k)  c(xM (k)))
 lim
k!0
( PM (k)  c(xM (k)))FM (k(1  "))
2
lim
k!0
FM (k)
fM (k(1  "))
by (37). Using again the optimality condition (23) for market-based investment,
( PM (k)  c(xM (k)))FM (k(1  "))
=    R kk(1 ")[p^(qM (k)  r)  c(xM (k))]dFM (r) < ,
Hence,
lim
k!0
(D0M ( PM (k)))
2
FM (k(1  ")) (
PM (k)  c(xM (k))) = 0.
It follows that the term in curly brackets of A00M (k) is strictly positive and bounded away from
zero for all k su¢ ciently close to zero. By using the optimality condition (23) for market-based
investment one nal time, I obtain
 FM (k)
q0M (k)
FM (k(1  "))
fM (k(1  "))
P 0M (k)
=  +
FM (k)
fM (k(1  ")) [
R r
k c
0(qM   r)dFM (r)  u00(qM   qn)]dFM (r)
+
R k
k(1 ")[
FM (k)
fM (k(1  "))(p^(qM   r)  c(xM ))f
0
M (r) + (
PM (k)  p^(qM   r))fM (r)]dr
so that
lim
k!0
(
FM (k(1  "))
fM (k(1  "))
P 0M (k))
2  (c
0(K1M ))
2
[
R r
0 c
0(D1M + qn   r)dFM (r)  u00(D1M )]2
> 0.
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Hence,
lim
k!0
B0( PM (k)  )FM (k(1  "))( P 0M (k))2
 lim
k!0
B0( PM (k)  )FM (k)
(c0(K1M ))
2 limk!0(
fM (k(1 "))
FM (k(1 "))
fM (k(1 "))
FM (k(1 ")))
[
R r
k c
0(D1M + qn   r)dFM (r)  u00(D1M )]2
The proof that limk!0B0( PM (k) )FM (k) > 0 and bounded away from zero is identical to the
proof that limk!0B( PM (k)  )FM (k) > 0 and bounded from zero and therefore omitted.
To summarize these ndings, assumptions (36) and (37) jointly imply that limk!0A00M (k)!
1 and q00M (k) > 0 for all k su¢ ciently close to zero. It then follows that
W 00M (k) =  qnA00M (k)   0M (k)q0M (k)   0M (k)q00M (k) < 0
for all k su¢ ciently close to zero. By continuity, therefore, WN (k) is strictly concave in the
domain (0; 2 maxfkN ; kIg), and WI(k) is strictly concave in the domain (0;maxfkN ; kIg) unless
kN and kI are large, in which case the second-derivatives ofWN (k) andWI(k) are indeterminate
for large enough values of k.
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